INTRODUCTION
One of the biggest mistakes one can make when considering the globalization of intellectual property law is to assume away the increasingly contentious politics of the phenomenon. This is not to say that the emerging politics of international intellectual property law are simple, easy to understand, or unchanging--quite the contrary is true. However, we should resist the understandable tendency to reach for a quick, technocratic set of Procrustean tools that assume away the "messiness of the world" and make it seem that concepts such as "sovereignty" and "property" should be, are, or always have been, particularly stable constructs. Professor Fred Cate has brought together at the Roundtable a diverse group of scholars working from a wide range of political and ideological positions. He should be commended for avoiding the pitfalls ofa"Jetson's Jurisprudence"' type of gathering that sanguinely implies that the "future is so bright, we need to wear sunglasses" because of a quick techno fix.
In the not-so-brave new world order 2 following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, questions about the limits of the nation-state and the market are more important than ever. In particular, when considering developments, such ' Associate Professor, University of Oregon School of Law; B.F.A., 1976 Wayne State University; M.A., 1986, Hunter College; J.D., 1990, Harvard Law School; LL.M., 1993, University of Wisconsin School of Law. Thanks to Fred Cate for inviting me to participate in this symposium as well to James Boyle, Rosemary Coombe, Ruth Gana, and Carol Rose, whose work continues to educate, inspire and challenge me. Thanks also to David Kennedy and other participants at the Dighton Writer's Workshop, where I presented a draft.
I. James Boyle coined the term "Jetson's Jurisprudence" which refers to a "style of legal writing [that employs] a listing of technological marvels in the hope they will make a related set of legal rules alluringly futuristic by association." SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 1998] NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY pointed out that so-called "private property" rights of individuals and firms were more or less state-backed delegations of public sovereignty-the ability to "tax" future social output. 4 Furthermore, Robert Hale wrote that the state's coercive force was similarly implicated in every "private" transaction in the market-even state noninterference with market transactions was a form of "public" intervention-by allowing and creating the legal rules of the game for private property owners to coerce one another in the "private" sphere, thereby implicating the state in underwriting "private" markets and their outcomes. If intellectual property may be fairly characterized as ajointly produced social product, 6 then the state-underwritten rules determining allocation of benefits from production of that social product constitute a delegation of the sovereign's power to "tax" via licensing, or, conversely, fair uses.
In agreements such as the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property The [legal] realists' coercion analysis contained a substantive insight as well, an insight into the role of legal rules. The state uses force to ensure obedience to the rules of the game of bargaining over a joint product. To the extent that these rules affect the outcome, forcing the parties to settle for x rather than y percent of thejoint product, the state is implicated in the outcome. It is an author of the distribution even though that distribution appears to be determined solely by the 'voluntary' agreement of the parties. It is not a stretch to conceive of"intellectual property" as ajoint product, consisting of differing proportions of preexisting works and ideas.
Furthermore, in the intellectual property area, the state is expressly implicated in conferring (or modifying) rights. This becomes clear when one realizes the "flip-ability" value in the area of fair use. For example, is the fair use doctrine a subsidy flowing to the public of users or consumers of copyrighted works? Or is a strong vision of copyright a subsidy flowing to authors from the public of potential users or consumers of works? It is far from clear that there is any determinate answer to the "efficiency" of either outcome. For a penetrating and useful analysis of the impossibility of establishing any neutral, prepolitical default from which to assess value, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank 1. Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv. 711 (1980) . See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1149 REV. , 1239 REV. -40 (1998 :
Even if allocative efficiency alone is considered, the desirable nature and extent of a copyright regime are uncertain. Why, after all, should the author or publisher ofa work own the copyright rather than just the copy itself?. ... Copyright has the effect of 'privatizing' and thereby bringing into the market goods that would otherwise be free to all. The longstanding convention that authors have a copyright in their works deflects attention from the fact that copyright is itself an intervention in the market, rather than as is so often made to appear, the 'natural' way of things.
[Vol. 6:11
Rights (TRIPS) component of GATT and the WTO, there are serious questions as to what nations, regions, and classes of persons benefit from "free trade," whether it be in scientific textbooks, bestsellers, bytes, germ plasm, or CDs. 7 On issues as far-ranging as the impact on scientific research of restrictive database protection laws" 8 to the impact on democratic dialogic participation, questions about the international political economy of intellectual property are becoming harder to avoid. 9 In particular, as between the developed nations of the North and the less developed countries of the South," increasing numbers of scholars have been questioning whether the flow of benefits of international intellectual property protection, which are part of the whole "free trade" [Vol. 6:11 In particular, disparities between North and South 23 are most pronounced as to the question of "free trade" and its relationship with the idea of "development." 24 The question facing the postwar architects of the world economic order was, Now that colonialization has ended, how do we move on? 25 In the 1960s, development of the Third World was seen as crucial, and the means whereby development would occur was via technological transfers. [T]he disparity between the richest countries in the world (bearing in mind that at least half of our people are not so rich) and the poorest in terms of income and access to basic resources (safe drinking water, sufficient caloric intake, medical attention and sanitation, education, and so on) is about 150 to t.... The North with about one-fourth of the world's population, consumes 70% of the world's energy, 75% of its metals, 85% of its wood and 60% of its food. (citing Human Development Report 1992 , U. N. Development Programme, at 34 (1992 The dualist model of development/modernization theory depicts the "problem" of underdevelopment as a matter to be remedied by a benign process through which the "modem world", together with the "advanced" ("Westernized," "modernized,") elite sectors of "backward" societies collaborate to "overcome" those societies' recalcitrant "traditionalism" that stood as a barrier to their progress. One implication of this conceptual framing was that persevering resistance to Western hegemony -in either its classically colonialist or neocolonialist forms -now could be marginalized not simply as anti-Western, but also as anti-modem, as a stubborn obstacle in the one-way street of progress, as anti-development. See also Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 21, at 349 n.39.
The theory that development is unilinear is an outgrowth of Darwinian thought which holds that progress is inevitable. According to this theory, poor countries of the world are simply replicas of developed countries at earlier stages in the[ir] development. With time, developing countries would go through their own industrial revolution and eventually achieve a level of development comparable to developed countries. 
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the World Bank tended to encourage privatized development."
By the early 1990s, with the enactment of TRIPS, Third World countries might be thought of as being coerced intojoining GATT, which literally said to Third World countries: If you want to export your goods, agricultural and otherwise, you must protect the intellectual properties of other nations. Thus, the cotton that passes out of Malaysia at one dollar per pound returns as a tshirt bearing the trademarked image of Mickey Mouse or Bart Simpson selling for twenty-five dollars. 3 ' Under the ideological banner of "free trade," the intellectual property regimes of the developed nations were given expanded reach-in other words, rules that purportedly were meant to encourage and protect creative expression and scientific innovation were now put in place, giving owners the legal means to reach extraterritorially into Third World countries to prevent unauthorized use. 32 TRIPS also places important constraints on the sovereignty of nations of the developing world to implement innovation schemes based on local and regional considerations, factors which may differ drastically from country to country and industry to industry. Ruth Gana writes:
Given the history of the international intellectual property system, the notion that either the pre-or post-TRIPS multilateral system is based upon consensus is still a myth as 30 [Vol. 6:11
NEOCOLONIALIsM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY far as developing countries are concerned. Those countries that will feel the brunt of its provisions include both the African countries that remain on the periphery of the international market and the emerging economies in Asia whose markets are attractive to foreign investors from the developed countries....
[T]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of economic ostracism, what could not be accomplished through negotiations independent of the international economic framework.... Copyright and patent laws will continue to extract exorbitant costs from developing countries in exchange for access to literary works, computer programs or other technology.... [G] iven the values reflected in the current intellectual property system, values which are deemed "universal" yet are clearly not, there is no assurance that the current framework will benefit developing countries in any significant way. 3 3 With regard to the long-term effects of growing disparities between the developed world and the developing world on questions of technology transfer, Jerome Reichman has been prescient. Professor Reichman asks us to consider whether we are in control of our institutions or whether they are in control of us. 34 By asking us to take North and South distributional consequences of intellectual property regimes seriously, Reichman asks us to consider the long-33. Gana REV. L. & EcoN. 61 (1996) . In some ways, the arguments that undergird both the free trade and the fair trade positions in terms of upwardly harmonizing the international trade framework carry less persuasive power in the intellectual property area than in the environmental and labor rights area.
36 [Vol. 6:11 1998] NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY WTO to expand statutorily the content of both national and international protections for intellectual property. When WIPO met in Geneva in December 1996, the copyright, media, and information industry representatives behind the Commerce Department's White Paper of 1995 sought to implement globally five problematic protections of otherwise uncopyrightable information within databases 39 advocated in the failed White Paper. 40 Because of vocal protests from the international scientific and legal communities, who viewed the proposed Treaty as potentially disastrous for scientific research, the proposed Database Protection Treaty was rejected, and the White Paper-like proposals were taken under consideration for further discussion by WIPO. 4 ' What is notable is that when the U.S. copyright and information industries could not get what they wanted on the domestic level, they sought to make a supranational end run, a tactic which has had some prior success with the TRIPS component 39. The 5 significant changes in domestic U.S. Copyright law that the failed 1995 White Paper advocated (which were advocated to WIPO in December 1996) were: (1) subjecting transitory or temporary copies in a computer Random Access Memory to the copyright owner's exclusive right to authorize reproductions thereby making RAM copies into infringing copies; (2) treating digital transmissions of copyrighted works as distributions to the public, thereby subjecting Interet Service Providers to a strict liability contributory infringement scheme; (3) imposing criminal sanctions as the penalty for tampering with copy-protection or management of digital texts; (4) curtailing the ability of states to make exceptions or limits on the exclusive rights of copyright owners, thereby modifying the "fair use" defense by instituting a problematic commercial and noncommercial use distinction and limiting first sale privileges; and (5) allowing copyright owners to challenge the manufacture and sale of technology or services that could circumvent copy-management or protection technology. In addition, the United States wanted WIPO to create a suigeneris legal protection for the contents of databases. There is a strong case to be made that African nations should be able to enact local copyright laws that allow for compulsory licensing, expanding and strengthening rules regarding exemptions for education and research purposes, simplifying copyright assignment clauses, and working toward a multilateral reduction in copyright term duration. 4 ' Admittedly, the tenor of the U.S. copyright industry's interpretation of TRIPS runs counter to these sorts of proposals, but at the very least, one should consider the importance of books and journals, particularly educational and scientific texts and in terms of generating local innovation, to the developing and least developed countries. Philip Altbach writes:
Copyright, after all, is a moral and ideological concept as well as a legal and economic one. There is no recognition that the 45. Altbach, supra note 43, at 8:
One of the most egregious violators of copyright in the nineteenth century was the United States, which felt, probably incorrectly, that it could build up its domestic publishing industry most effectively by freely reprinting works from abroad while protecting the rights of domestic authors. Once American publishing was well developed, the United States became a defender of copyright. Until the 1960s, the Soviet Union had a similar perspective-international copyright was violated as the country used knowledge from abroad for its own purposes. China had a similar perspective up to the 1990s and has only recently joined the international copyright system. Nations must see copyright as in their best national interest before they become fully supportive of it. ("Even meeting the basic needs for achieving mass distribution, i.e., adequate book manufacturing equipment, distribution equipment, display equipment, a distribution system and plan (including transportation), necessary capital, an adequate editorial and production staff, and tax relief, is beyond the capabilities of publishers in most developing countries.").
legacy of colonialism and the power of multinationals has, to a significant extent, created the current highly unequal world knowledge system. It is, of course, much easier for the "haves" to cling to the economic and legal system that has given them a virtual monopoly over the world's knowledge products than to recognize that we live in an interdependent world and that the Third World desperately needs access to knowledge and technology.... [These needs] are not limited to the poor countries of the developing world. For example, Moscow's famed Lenin Library is no longer purchasing any scientificjournals from the West because there is no allocation of "hard currency" funds. Few, if any, other libraries or academic institutions in the former Soviet Union are able to obtain access to key books and journals in the current circumstances. The situation is even more desperate for many sub-Saharan African countries, where purchases of books and journals from abroad ceased several years ago because of lack of funds. . . . The end of conflicts in such countries as Cambodia, Laos, Uganda, Angola, Ethiopia and others has permitted them to turn their attention to the rebuilding of educational and library systems-and there is a desperate need for books of all kinds.
9
One troubling example of the unidirectional drain of intellectual resources from the Third World is the research area of African oral literatures and traditions. These cultural stories and practices do not belong to any individual; instead, they are the cultural property of ethnic groups or nations. However, as soon as researchers (with most coming from the North) collect this cultural and traditional material, and copyright the resulting compilation, no one can use the 49. Altbach, supra note 43, at 7.
[Vol. 6:11 material without the researcher's permission." The pattern is becoming depressingly familiar: resources flow out of the Southern regions and are transformed by Northern entrepreneurial authors and inventors into intellectual properties, which in many cases are priced so high that the people from whom such knowledge originated cannot afford to license them.
It is important that intellectual property policy, whether on the domestic or international level, should not be driven solely by the maximalist imperative. The maximalist logic seems to be that if a little bit of protection is good, then a lot will be better, leading us to levels of intellectual property protection spiraling ever upward. There is no consideration of the idea that traditional intellectual property law has been concerned with striking a balance between society's interests and those of individual creators. Reichman importantly reminds us that traditionally intellectual property policy has sought to strike this balance between incentives or rewards to creators and the interests of users, consumers and competitors-the public. Furthermore, by ignoring the importance of this idea of a necessary balance and opting for over-protection, we may "misallocate... scarce resources devoted to research and development and... reduce the efficiencies that flow from reverse-engineering and from cumulative, sequential innovation generally."'" Also in the international arena, policies that produce oligopolistic barriers block entry for firms in the nations of the least-developed and developing world.
As legal regimes ofthe world's developed nations steadily expand the scope of property rights in information, many decision makers begin opting for multilateral and supranational intellectual property regimes. As transnational intellectual property regimes begin setting minimum standards of protection, traditional territorial and political notions of sovereignty are eroded. This occurs in large part because entities holding increasingly large blocks of intellectual property rights are not nations, but instead are "private" multinational corporations. The irony is that such entities must then assert the 50. Chakava, supra note 44, at 20.
Africa's leading fiction writers are published in the North, mostly in Britain, France and the United States. The majority ofthem sprang into prominence in the 1950s and 1960s when the African publishing industry was either at its nascent stage, or did not exist at all. 
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"sovereignty" of domestic intellectual property laws to underwrite their ownership claims. 2 It is on the level of national sovereignty that countries of the least-developed and developing world may be able to make strong arguments for a procompetitive interpretation of TRIPS. It is here that Reichman argues for striking a balance among producers, competitors, users and consumers, with a view towards long-term stabilization, rather than short-term maximum returns, to an increasingly concentrated small number of transnational producers based in the nations of the developed world. 
NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY flimsy metal kiosks proliferate." Underlining the contingency of our property classifications, Heller identifies three key elements of socialist property law that became problems as Soviet law transitioned to a market economy: (1) a hierarchy of property, placing state property with the most protection and socalled "private property" with the least protection; 58 (2) the objects of greatest economic value, such as land, were defined as unitary and said to belong to "the people;" 59 and (3) there were divided, multiple, and overlapping rights to control socialist property that resided in various levels of the state bureaucracy -no individual "owner" was assigned to a particular object. The problem was that too many "owners" possessed a "right to exclude" related to a particular object of property such that it remained underutilized." A crucial difference between Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" and Heller's "Tragedy of the Anticommons" is what happens with the "right to exclude." 62 In the commons situation, part of the problem is that no one has the 57. Id. at 631.
The working hypothesis in this section is that private property emerges less successfully in resources that begin transition [from a socialist to a market economy] with the most divided ownership. In such resources, poorly performing anticommons property is most likely to appear and persist. In contrast, private property emerges more successfully in resources that begin transition with a single owner holding a near-standard bundle of market legal rights. 58. Id. at 628-29.
Socialist law erected a hierarchy based on the level of protection afforded property held by different owners. At top was socialist property, which received the most protection. Next came cooperative property, which received similar but somewhat less protection. Personal property received still less protection. The residual category of private property was abolished altogether in the Soviet Union; the rest of the socialist world gave it the least protection from taxation, regulation, and confiscation. 59. Id. at 629.
[A]II productive assets were in principle "unitary" and belonged to the "people as a whole," socialist law did not delineate the ordinary physical boundaries.... In the early years of the transition from socialism, private owners and public officials often could not answer the question, "Who controls the land on which we stand?" 60. Id. ("Instead of assigning an owner to each object, socialist law created a complex hierarchy of divided and coordinated rights in the objects it identified [that could be] loosely comparefed] to Western forms of trust ownership.").
61. Professor Heller gives many other examples ofanticommons property, such as the Sergeant Preston of the Yukon-Quaker Oats one-square inch of land giveaway in the 1950s. Other examples include restrictive covenants in deeds or land use permitting processes where multiple parties exercise what could be thought of as the "right to exclude" certain types of development. See id. at 679 n.259.
Id.
[Flour categories of rights-holders emerged during the transition. Each of these categories of rights-holders are 'owners' in the sense that they could block other rightsholders from using a store without permission .... right to exclude, thereby giving rise to over-utilization and depletion. By contrast, with the anticommons situation, too many parties independently possess the right to exclude, giving rise to under-utilization-tragedy of the anticommons. 63 In one situation, the "bundle of sticks" comprising property rights lacks a significant "stick"--no one party is able to exclude any other party from the "commons." In the other situation, the significant "stick" (the right to exclude) is broken up and held by many parties-any of whom may exercise the right. Many traditional aspects of U.S. intellectual property law seem to intuitively reflect Professor Heller's observations about the problem of "too many" potential owners." 64. For example, consider the statutory rules and case law surrounding the works-made-for-hire doctrine, that seeks to clarify and consolidate ownership rights for commissioned works and works made as part of an employment relationship. In the absence of such rules, one could imagine an anticommons situation. See 17 U.S. C § 201 (1996) :
In the case of work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. See also the definition of "work made for hire" at 17 U.S.C. § 101(1996); Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); cf Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that provisions of employee benefits and tax treatment are the most important factors in determining whether a person is an independent contractor or employee).
Consider also the Joint Works category, for which a deliberate intent must be shown to have created a collaborative work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) ("A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."); see also Also, consider the geographic scope of a common-law trademark-it is possible for multiple trademark proprietors to have exclusive rights in the same mark in different regions of the country. See DONALD S.
CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at § 5E[2] (1992):
At common law, a manufacturer or merchant's trademark rights geographically extended only to markets in which he sold the trademark bearing-goods. Notwithstanding the first use priority rule, a second user could obtain exclusive trademark rights by adopting and using in good faith in a remote market a mark similar or identical to a first user's. such as the case with the development of radio technology prior to World War I, where, two economic competitors held key components to radio technology and neither would cross-license to the other. 6 " The impasse was ultimately broken by the U.S. government which needed radio technology in the war effort and managed to force the parties holding blocking patents to work together. Similarly, granting or expanding proprietary rights in fundamental aspects of things such as the basic information in databases 69 or functionally necessary 67. Theoretically, at least, the doctrines of denying protection to utilitarian aspects of useful goods and the dichotomy between idea and expression in copyright law work to ensure that the basic ideas remain nonproprietary. Similarly in trademark law, the idea of aesthetic functionality (or functionality in the design patent area) works to keep certain basic design features from becoming proprietary. And the unpatentability of mathematical formula, naturally occurring substances, and the laws of nature works conceptually similarly in Patent. Needless to say, while these doctrines serve to avoid anticommons property situations, at the margins ofall of these areas, there is substantial doctrinal confusion about where to draw the line between protection and unprotectability. By the beginning of World War I, a number of companies had arrived at a stalemate with regard to radio development, due to mutual patent interferences. During the war, when the government guaranteed to protect the companies from infringement suits, research in radio proceeded at a rapid pace. The close of the war, however, brought with it a renewed deadlock. "Ownership of the various patents pertaining to vacuum tubes and circuits by different concerns prevented the manufacture of an improved tube for radio use." In addition to domestic competition, there was a very real possibility that control over radio might be secured by the British Marconi Company, which was trying at the time to obtain rights to the necessary GE-controlled Alexanderson alternator.
In light of this threat to American supremacy of the airwaves, Woodrow Wilson and a number of armed-forces representatives prevailed upon GE to withhold the necessary patent rights and set up instead an American-owned company to control radio. In late 1919, GE thus established the Radio Corporation of America... and transferred its assets, along with the Alexanderson and other GE-owned patents, to RCA. The industry-wide impasse nevertheless remained, and "the only solution.., was to declare a truce: get together and draw up an agreement defining the rights of the various squatters on the frontiers of science. computer programs 7° may have the unintended consequence of bringing about a situation ofunderutilization and lower innovation and competition with regard to those items. Looking to an even earlier time, consider how copyrights in maps and navigational charts were seen as giving rise to either a monopoly on descriptions of geographic and navigational features of coastlines or to an underutilization of navigational charts. 7 ' Benjamin Kaplan has pointed out that one reason legal documents (conceived of as legal "maps") have generally not been thought of as possessing thick copyrights is that doing so might create situations where too many people would be drafting around earlier legal documents creating an unacceptable level of unpredictability. 7 2 In a sense, to give strong legal protection to legal boilerplate would create an anticommons situations where law firms would expend wasteful amounts of time exercising and policing their "property rights" in legal language.
Similarly, under traditional understandings of trademark law, generic or common descriptions of goods," mere geographic designations of origin 74 and surnames 75 were not considered susceptible to proprietorship without a showing that they had acquired "secondary meaning" in the minds of relevant consumers. 76 
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GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL involved its shape or packaging, was not considered protectable unless it was nonfunctional or inherently distinctive. Until the Two Pesos case in 1992,1 7 it was necessary to show a secondary meaning as well. After Two Pesos, no showing of secondary meaning is required, thereby expanding the scope of trade dress protection. These doctrines were all common-sense recognitions that allowing property ownership (the right to exclude) to vest in things like ideas, 78 facts," 9 mathematical formulas," laws of nature,"' and common descriptive words or phrases would lead to underutilization of intellectual works incorporating those preexisting, fundamental building blocks. 82 Intuitively and implicitly, the traditional intellectual property understandings of what was considered to be in the public domain was seemingly an attempt to avoid a "tragedy of the anticommons."
One key difference between Moscow storefronts and patents or copyrights is that intellectual property rights do not involve a tangible boundary, but rather a conceptual boundary-a boundary demarcated by the legal line between that which is considered to be in the public domain (ideas; functional aspects of useful goods and facts distinguished from original authorial expressions in copyright; mathematical formulas; laws of nature distinguished from novel, nonobvious, useful innovations in patent; and surnames and geographically descriptive and common or generic terms distinguished from arbitrary, fanciful, distinctive marks with secondary meaning in trademark law) and the private domain. Another key difference between physical property and intellectual 77. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (stating that proof of secondary meaning not required under a Lanham Act § 43(a) claim when trade dress is inherently distinctive). See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1996) (often referred toas a federal unfair competition law, because § 43(a) does not require registration on the principal register).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1996) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."); see also [Vol. 6:1 1 NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY property is that the supply of storefronts or grazing land is physically finite. As Heller points out, if one continues drawing boundaries and parceling out property rights, one eventually ends up with a spatial anticommons.
Elsewhere, I have discussed the "public goods" aspects of intellectual property, 8 3 but the main relevant point is that intellectual property seems infinite, as though it were created ex nihilo, pulled from the empty ether by the fevered imagination or intellect ofa transformative artistic or scientific genius. As James Boyle has articulately pointed out, it is this vision of romantic creativity that makes our common sense traditional intellectual property law and doctrines expand consistently, if not always in the direction of greater protection. 4 This expansion tends to make us ignore the common-sense knowledge that new intellectual creations are formed from preexisting thoughts and ideas in a long chain stretching back into antiquity. This particular and peculiar vision of creativity makes it seem that expanding the scope and increasing the types of intellectual property are without cost because the supply of new ideas and works is apparently infinite. I say that this is apparent, because as Heller points out, there is a point where too many property rights owned by too many parties creates a legal "smog," that is, an anticommons. When we reach this situation, a serious and consequentialist rethinking and rebundling of property rights may be necessary so that we may connect the purpose and intent of our intellectual property (or other) laws with their effects-to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." 85 Thus, the nonphysicality of intellectual property may matter less here than the idea of the scope of initial intellectual property entitlement as well as how the rights to control are bundled.
Reichman argues that we are able to recognize these types of concerns, and to tailor our legal system to address them. Observed in this light, the landmark Feist case might be seen in part as an attempt to avoid a "tragedy of the anticommons'-an attempt to make sure that the threshold for copyright 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL [Vol. 6:11 ownership was not set so low that all sorts of infringement claims would arise, resulting in the underutilization of facts and data from public domain sources. However, note that while the questions of commons or anticommons property has not been generally addressed when considering expanding the scope of patent rights, whether through the doctrine of equivalents' or through statutory interpretation of subject matter categories (e.g., medical procedures or sports moves"') within the United States, perhaps it should be. There is another wrinkle in considering the expanding scope of domestic intellectual property protection and the "public domain." In many ways, our current conception of the public domain is that nobody affirmatively owns public domain materials. It is this unowned characterization that is somewhat at odds with a characterization of the public domain of intellectual materials as Although the norms of sports enthusiasts might be offended, sports is now big business, and big business demands this protection. Entire industries exist to sell and promote goods and services at sporting events and for use by sports participants. Players in this vast market may benefit from the efficiency of fixed property rights in the fuel that drives these market transactions. A key element of that fuel is the sports moves themselves, and patents, copyrights and trademarks may provide the best tools for securing those rights. See also Fisher, supra note 86, at 4-5.
NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY a commons.
88
For example, Carol Rose has raised a set of extremely cogent arguments in response to Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons. Rose has described how in certain situations the solution to depletion or overutilization of scarce resources may not be to bestow private property rights, but to deploy common law and statutory strategies that she has referred to as involving the Comedy of the Commons. 9 The situations that Rose refers to involve what is thought of as "public property." Rose points to the long Western legal pedigree of the idea of "public property," orjuspublicum" Traditionally, due to their "inherent publicness," certain types of property-land between high and low tides, roadways, land underlying navigable waterways, and other such properties-were conceived of as being subject to a public easement for fishing, commercial and navigation purposes. 91 
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GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL [Vol. 6:11 state courts began using these older precedents, some dating back to the midnineteenth century, to carve out a growing set of "public rights" that served to limit what private property owners could do with their property.' In particular, the public easement for fishing, commerce and navigation has been expanded to include recreational uses, and in some cases has been extended to include dry sand areas of beaches. 93 Rose observes:
Like the older precedents, the new beach cases usually employ one of three theoretical bases: (1) a "public trust" theory, to the effect that the public has always had rights of access to the relinquish its power over a public resource should be invalidated under the doctrine.... What we have here is a transparent giveaway of public property to a private entity. The lakebed of Lake Michigan is held in trust for and belongs to the citizenry of the state. The conveyance of lakebed property to a private party-no matter how reputable and highly motivated that private party may be-violates this public trust doctrine. property in question, and that any private rights are subordinate to the public's "trust" rights; (2) a prescriptive or dedicatory theory, by which a period of public usage gives rise to an implied grant or gift from private owners; and (3) a theory of "custom," where the public asserts ownership of property under some claim so ancient that it antedates any memory to the contrary.9
Rose goes on to observe that these cases seemingly contradict traditional economic analysis by inverting the logic of viewing private property as the optimal solution to the tragedy of the commons. At first blush, these cases take private property and turn it into a commons, in which anyone and everyone can overuse and despoil such properties-the right to exclude has been taken from the owner's bundle of sticks. This raises the question whether, "[A]ny property inherently or even presumptively [should be] withdrawn from exclusive private expropriation?" 95 To answer this question, Rose points to two traditional exceptions to the general preference favoring private property ownership: (1) 'plenteous' goods. ... [T] hings that are either so plentiful or so unbounded that it is not worth the effort to create a system of resource management... [f] or which the difficulty of privatization outweighs the gains in careful resource management," ' and, (interestingly for intellectual property purposes); (2) public goods "where many persons desire access to or control over a given property, but they are too numerous and their individual stakes too small to express their preferences in market transactions." ' 97 Interestingly, note that intellectual property possesses two characteristics ofa "public good:" jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion.
While the analogy between real property and intellectual property is incomplete and discontinuous in many ways, some of the logic of the "public trust" and "custom" cases, such as National Audubon Society v. Superior Court ofAlpine County (the "Mono Lake" case) 9 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL [Vol. 6:11 of Cannon Beach in 1993," may be helpful in framing questions of the intellectual public domain. In the Mono Lake case, the California Supreme Court stated that the State of California lacked the authority to grant the City of Los Angeles absolute water rights which had significant ecological impact (drawing down the water level in Mono Lake by diverting five feeder streams to Los Angeles and shrinking Mono Lake by over a third in size) on areas that were subject to the public trust."° In the Stevens case, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the denial of a building permit to build a seawall on the dry sand area of a beach was not a taking under the Just Compensation Clause, and that maintenance of public access to the dry sand beach had arisen pursuant to the doctrine of custom.' The Stevens case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied certiorari over a strong dissent from Justices Scalia and O'Connor. 2 What significance might a salt lake in California and a stretch of dry sand beach in Oregon hold for intellectual property law?
First, the logic of both opinions suggests that certain types of land possessing unique characteristics are subject to the public trust. A baseline presumption in U.S. property law is that all property rights within the United States originate from the United States or some predecessor sovereign. When the federal sovereign passed these property rights either to the state sovereigns or to private individuals, it retained or reserved the stick in the property rights 99. Stevens, 854 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 , 1335 (1994 (Scalia, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
100. National Audubon Soc'y; 658 P.2d at 724.
[Tihe public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust. 101. Stevens, 854 P.2d at 456-57.
When plaintiffs took title to their land, they were on notice that exclusive use of the dry sand areas was not a part of the "bundle of rights" that they acquired, because public use of dry sand areas "is so notorious that notice of the custom on the part of persons buying land along the shore must be presumed.". . .We, therefore, hold that the doctrine of custom as applied to public use of Oregon's dry sand areas is one of "the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property... already place upon land ownership." ... We hold that plaintiffs have never had the property interests that they claim were taken by defendants' decision and regulations. 102. Stevens, 854 P.2d 449, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1332 Ct. , 1335 Ct. (1994 (Scalia, J. and O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of cert.):
To say that this case raises a serious Fifth Amendment takings issue is an understatement. The issue is serious in the sense that it involves a holding of questionable constitutionality; and it is serious in the sense that the land-grab (if there is one) may run the entire length of the Oregon coast.
bundle pertaining to use and maintenance of those properties, consistent with the public trust. To the extent that private property owners use their property contrary to the public trust, state government may move in to regulate or prohibit those uses in the name of exercising its reserved public trust responsibilities, thereby acting as trustee for members of the public. Additionally, when acting pursuant to the public trust, no "taking" occurs because the "right" to use private property contrary to the public trust was never a part of the bundle of sticks that we call property ownership in the first place, but was reserved by the sovereign. Similarly, in the Stevens case, expectations that had arisen over the course of a long period of time about public beach access were recognized, and thejudicial (or legislative) recognition of these customary rights effected no "taking" either because the property owner took title subject to, and with notice of, the "custom" of beach access in Oregon.
The relevance for intellectual property law is that instead of geographic features of land (beaches, lakes, and wetlands), there may be categories of information that could be conceived of as possessing characteristics of public trust property. One problem with our intellectual property law, and copyright law in particular, is that it, on a general level, treats all copyrightable subject matter the same. For example, a song by Kurt Cobain is different from a scientific treatise, DOOM is different from a first grade textbook about the alphabet, an X-Men comic book is different than Lotus 1-2-3. Perhaps there are some categories of uses that might be worth granting an "easement"-like right in members of the public (or for that matter, publishers in the Third World).
The structure of the argument would proceed through several steps. First, because the U.S. Constitution mandates "securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries" in order to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," there is a link between the positivist property rights granted and a constitutionally mandated public purpose. Second, one might argue that this grant is from the sovereign to "authors and inventors" only to the extent that promotion of that public purpose (advancing science and the useful arts) is achieved. Furthermore, such a conditioned grant presupposes a reservation of power in the sovereign when the actual effects of such a grant work against those public purposes. A shadow of this reasoning can be seen in copyright and patent misuse cases. The grant of exclusive rights to authors and inventors never included the right to use that grant for anticompetitive purposes that are contrary to antitrust laws-it was never a stick in the bundle of rights that comes with a patent or a
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL [Vol. 6:11 copyright. 3 Another shadowy example is copyright law's fair use doctrine and patent law's reverse doctrine of equivalent exceptions-one might conceive of "fair use" or "reverse doctrine ofequivalents" as a species of "easement" in the name of the public."°T hird, this line of reasoning embodies some broad-based public trust-type 103. In the patent misuse area, see Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (refusing use of licenses beyond term of patent); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Robin & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (tying unpatented products to patented products to capture the market for both); U.S. Dept. of Justice Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property § 5.6 (Aug. 8, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (prohibiting certain types of "grant back" clauses that require a patent licensee to "grant back" to the licensor any improvement patents). See generally Mark A. Lemley, Note, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1599 REv. (1990 .
In the area of copyright, misuse is relatively recent. In particular, since 1990, there have been a number of cases finding a plaintiff's copyright unenforceable because of misuse. See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5"' Cir. 1996) (finding copyright misuse appropriate where copyright owner tried expanding the copyright beyond its scope into a patent-like monopoly); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1547 (1 1 h Cir. 1996) (suggesting that copyright misuse was relevant to prevent an owner 104. Some other examples of areas where lower (or nonexistent) levels of per se intellectual property protection have actually helped spur competitiveness and innovation are: clothing designs (which are noncopyrightable, although trade dress protection may apply for confusingly similar garments); utilitarian aspects of useful goods; architectural designs prior to 1992 (when architectural works became copyrightable); university-sponsored scientific research prior to 1984 (when the federal government directed that such research be patented); and legal documents (which while copyrightable, are seldom asserted) and judicial opinions.
of responsibility reserved to the federal government to keep certain information (for example, some types of basic scientific research, information in databases, educational purposes and uses, new medical techniques, or even human genomic material)' 5 available and open to benefit both the public and private owners. Lastly, an important point is that this line of reasoning conceptualizes information in the public domain not as "unowned," but as owned by everyone. Part of the tragedy of the commons was that no one asserted the public right to maintain the commons-the default position seemed to be a powerless local government. As Rose has shown, public and private property rights work in tandem to maintain a vibrant free-enterprise system."°e Duncan Kennedy and Frank Michelman have argued that:
[While] much legal and related policy-analytic literature reflects and reinforces the view that certain legal institutions (e.g., private property, free contract) are in some sense generally orpresumptively efficient, while others (e.g., central regulatory command, commonses) are generally or presumptively inefficient.... [A]ny actually efficient regime, though it may well contain rules fairly characterizable as private property and free contract, must contain them in combination with rules drawn from realms perceived as opposite to private property/free contract (viz., unowned commonses and collective controls) so that there is no more reason for awarding the palm of "presumptive efficiency" to private property/free contract than to its opposites. 07 105. The copyright statute already has a plethora of odd, seemingly unconnected exemptions. See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (6) (1994) (exempting from copyright infringement liability a "performance of a nondramatic musical work by a governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural ... fair or exhibition conducted by such body or organization..."); 17 U.S.C. § 110(1) (1994) (exempting a"performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction... 106. A Dozen Propositions, supra note 88, at 267.
[H]istoric Anglo-American legal principles did indeed recognize the importance of private property rights, which are essential in a functioning free enterprise economy. But those principles also recognized what were called "public rights," particularly in resources that are not easily turned into private property-historically, air, water resources, and fish and wildlife stocks--because the management of such diffuse resources is also essential in a functioning economic order of free enterprise. 107. Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 16, at 714.
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Perhaps, some types of information may be so conceptually similar to things like land underlying navigable waterways, beaches and coastal areas, and the electromagnetic spectrum, that too many private property rights give rise to "common pool" problems that are only addressable through some type of regulatory regime that ensures continued access for the public. Note that in this formulation, the anticommons problem does not arise because "everyone" does not possess the "right to exclude" as was the case with Moscow storefronts, but the "public" (via the government) may be able to prevent private parties from making maximalist property claims that harm the promotion of science and useful arts. Additionally, rather than conceptualizing the intellectual public domain as unowned (a sort of default zone where things that are so rudimentary or useless come to lie), we may be able to conceptualize it as an intellectual zone where things that are too important to be owned by one party reside. They are, in effect, owned by the public.
There are three major criticisms of this approach. First, it is unclear (even in the real property area) whether the federal government is subject to the public trust doctrine. To date, it has been largely a creature of state common law and has been quite controversial over the past three decades0' 3 Indeed, I am not even arguing that public trust doctrine be applied to intellectual property, only that it may provide a different perspective on conceptualizing intellectual property rights. Second, there are large definitional problems in terms of delineating categories of creations that might be subject (educational, scientific, and so on)-how narrowly or broadly should possible categories be defined to this "intellectual public trust," particularly given the paradigmatic institutional capture by the agropharmaceutical and copyright industries of the U.S. Copyright and Patent and Trademark Office in the 1990s. Finally, questions of standing to sue would be very problematic in terms of who would be empowered to assert the "public trust." There are an increasing number of organizations that are possible candidates, such as the Taxpayer Assets Project (headed by James Love), the Electronic Frontier Foundation or the Digital Future Coalition that opposed the adoption in 1996 of the WIPO Database Protection Proposal.
I do not offer these observations to introduce a ready-for-implementation [Vol. 6:11 NEOCOLONIALISM, ANTICOMMONS PROPERTY legislative orjudicial proposal-far from it. I believe that some of the ultimate goals that underlie the public trust doctrine in the environmental law area may have some deep connections with how we are administering and constructing our information environment-in particular, how we talk about "property," intellectual or otherwise. A privatized information environment that is unable to contemplate any other standard for measuring its worth other than market efficiency may be, on many levels, a dystopian environment indeed.
James Boyle has recently written of the analogies between the nascent state of environmental law in the early 1960s, when public consciousness of the dangers of environmental degradation began dawning, and the current state of public consciousness of intellectual property laws."° Boyle has called for an "environmentalism for the Net" in terms of the need for activism in the name of protecting and maintaining a healthy balance of public and private rights in the digital environment. Boyle points out:
In both environmental protection and intellectual property, the very structure of the decision-making process tends to produce a socially undesirable outcome. Decisions in a democracy are made badly when they are primarily made by and for the benefit of a few stakeholders, be they landowners or content providers. It is a matter of rudimentary political science analysis or public choice theory to say that democracy fails when the gains of a particular action can be captured by a relatively small and well-identified group while the losses--even if larger in the aggregate-are low-level effects spread over a larger, more inchoate group. This effect is only intensified when the transaction costs of identifying and resisting the change are high."
As part of this "environmentalism" to protect the "intellectual" environment, we must first define exactly what we are protecting, which is where the works of Reichman, Rose, and Boyle are very helpful. If we fail to begin this project now, in fifty years we may find ourselves looking back as we consider how the true "tragedy of the commons" was the massive privatization 
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Ill. THE LEGITIMACY OF CULTURAL APPROPRIATIONS
Connected to questions about our legal construction of the intellectual public domain are additional and troubling questions of cross-cultural appropriations that occur with greater frequency in the not-so-brave new world economic order of TRIPS and globalization. We need to be careful about constructing the public domain to avoid conceiving of the biological and cultural resources of the Third World as belonging to the "common heritage of humanity," thereby effectively putting them up for grabs by entrepreneurs from the developed countries eager to turn such public domain items into private intellectual property. There is a paradoxical need to simultaneously rein in the maximalist impulse in the intellectual laws of the developed countries and to imagine ways to protect the cultural and biological resources of the developing and least developed countries. In particular, there is a very serious question whether the category "property," or the historically contingent and individualistic notion of "property" that has arisen in the West, is even appropriate when discussing things like agricultural practices, cell lines, seed plasm, and oral narratives that "belong" to communities rather than individuals." 2 Ifwe are not capable ofacknowledgingthe existence of different life-worlds and ways of envisioning human beings' relationship to the natural world in our intellectual property laws, then unfortunately, it may be late in the day for biodiversity and hopes for a genuinely multicultural world." 3 There is money to be made in genetic research, because pharmaceutical companies are eager to buy the patent rights for cloned genes that could be used to create new families of drugs. For example, the gene that regulates the production of leptin, which in turn regulates the metabolism of fat, was purchased by the pharmaceutical company Amgen from Rockefeller University for $20 million. The search for the asthma gene of Tristan de Cunha is being financed by Axys Pharmaceuticals.
See
Vandana Shiva," 4 Ruth L. Gana (Okedij i),' s Rosemary Coombe," 6 James Boyle,"' Jack Kloppenberg," 8 and others" 9 have been writing and working to theorize and publicize what has been called the "Great Seed Ripoff"-international conventions granting "plant breeder's rights allowing commercial plant breeders to use traditional indigenous varieties of seeds, and 'improve' them via minor genetic alterations and then receive patents in the varieties, eventually selling them back to the communities that produced them initially."' 20 However, their concerns go much further than merely protesting the granting of U.S. patents in seed plasm and biologically-engineered genetic material. Vandana Shiva writes:
The freedom that transnational corporations are claiming through intellectual property rights protection in the GATT agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights is the freedom that European colonizers have claimed since 1492. Columbus set a precedent when he treated the license to conquer non-European peoples as a natural right of European men. The land titles issued by the pope through European kings and queens were the first patents .... Eurocentric notions of property and piracy are the bases on which the IPR 
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GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL laws of the GATT and [WTO] have been framed. When Europeans first colonized the non-European world, they felt it was their duty to "discover and conquer," to "subdue, occupy, and possess," ... [elverything, every society, every culture. The colonies have now been extended to the interior spaces, the "genetic codes" of life-forms from microbes and plants to animals, including humans.... The assumption of empty lands, terra nullius, is now being expanded to 'empty life,' seeds and medicinal plants ... [and this] same logic is being used to appropriate biodiversity from the original owners and innovators by defining their seeds, medicinal plants, and medical knowledge as nature, as nonscience, and treating tools of genetic engineering as the yardstick of "improvement."... At the heart of the GATT treaty and its patent laws is the treatment of biopiracy as a natural right of Western corporations, necessary for the "development" of Third World communities.
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The question of the direction of the flow of valuable resources, whether genetic or indigenous agricultural or medical knowledge, is extremely relevant to constructing the intellectual public domain as well. As Vandana Shiva points out, representing the cultural property of non-European peoples as "natural" or "primitive" equates such properties as "unowned" and up for grabs by erstwhile and entrepreneurial "civilized" proprietors. Any formulation ofthe intellectual public domain must take account of the culture-bound nature of our concepts of property and how:
The model on which protection of creative labor currently [advocated by TRIPS] is premised on a unique combination of convictions about what constitutes property, the role of property, and the use of property rights to allocate resources .. . [and] The sad irony is that the intellectual property-rich nations of the developed world have pushed for swift enactment of TRIPS in order to avoid what they claim are disastrous and ruinous levels of piracy oftheir intellectual properties, whether computer programs, videos, music CDs, movies, or technology, by countries of the developing and least developed nations. However, the ideological content of these piracy claims becomes evident when considering that the fears seem to mask the amount of piracy occurring in the opposite direction-invaluable biological and cultural resources flowing out of the countries of the South as "raw materials" into the developed nations of the North where they are magically transformed in the laboratories of pharmaceutical and agricultural corporations into protected intellectual properties whose value is underwritten by provisions of multilateral agreements such as TRIPS. Vandana Shiva writes:
The United States has accused the Third World of piracy. The estimates for royalties lost are $202 million per year for agricultural chemicals and $2.5 billion annually for pharmaceuticals. In a 1986 U.S. For example, it raises the issue of what role national sovereignty may play in establishing local regimes not only of intellectual property protection, but also local regimes that dictate that certain subject matter will not be susceptible to privatization and appropriation. It may be that despite many rumors of its impending demise in the era of globalization, news of the demise of the nationstate may be premature. Ironically, the increasing transnational proprietors of vast (and private) intellectual property holdings must turn to the national legal regimes in order to underwrite the value of their holdings. Additionally, there is a paradox, because as "free trade" ideally envisages a single global market, traditionally both publishers asserting copyrights and corporations asserting patents have depended on their ability to restrict territorially rights in separate national markets-markets that are underwritten and demarcated by national sovereignty. Thus, it is far from clear that a global intellectual property will be able to be completely free from the centripetal pull of national or local intellectual property regimes.
For example, the Indian Government is currently considering legislation creating a National Bioresource Authority (NBA) to protect India's bioresources and would:
[Prohibit non-Indians] from "obtaining any biological resources for research or commercial utilization or collecting samples or undertaking any activity in the nature of bioprospecting without previous approval of the NBA" [and makes it illegal for an Indian citizen to transfer] "the results of any research with respect to any biological resource for monetary consideration to any person who is not a citizen of India without NBA approval." Violators will face a five-year jail term and a fine of US $30, 000.24 This type of legislation has been inspired in large part by the activities of companies such as W.R. Grace, the Native Plant Institute, and the Japanese Terumo Corporation that together have patented a number of products derived from the neem tree. The neem tree is a versatile Indian plant, an evergreen that grows up to fifty feet in height. The neem tree's bark, flowers, seeds, and fruit have been used medicinally since ancient times to treat a wide variety of ailments. Additionally, branches of the neem tree have been used as an antiseptic toothbrush, and its oil has been used in toothpaste and soap. Importantly, residue of neem seeds, after oil has been extracted, has been used for generations as a potent insecticide against locusts, nematodes, mosquito larvae, boll weevils, and beetles. 2 In 1971, Robert Larson, a U.S. national who was aware of the multiple uses of the neem tree in India, imported neem seeds to the United States and began experimenting with them, ultimately producing and patenting a pesticide named Margosan-O made from neem extract. Since the mid-1980s, Grace and other firms have received over a dozen patents on neem-based solutions and emulsions; Larson sold his patent to W.R. Grace in 1988. W.R. Grace has set up a plant and network to process twenty tons of neem seed per day. Neem seed prices have gone up from 3 00 rupees per 124. K.S. Jayaraman, India Drafts Law to Protect Bioresources, NATURE, Nov. 13, 1997, at 108.
A key provision of the legislation is that no one will be able to apply for a patent based on research or information gathered from any Indian biological resource without informing the NBA. Before giving permission for patenting, the authority will impose a benefit-sharing fee or royalty which will be credited to a biological diversity fund to be used to develop the communities which helped to conserve the biological resources. 
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[A]n often free resource into an exorbitantly priced one, with the local user now competing for seed with an industry that is supplying wealthy consumers in the North. As the local farmer cannot afford the price that industry can, the diversion of the seed as raw material from the community to industry will ultimately establish a regime in which a handful of companies holding patents will control all access and all production related to neem as raw material. 26 Another example of this biocolonialism where resources and discoveries flow out of the Third World as "raw materials," only to return from the laboratories of the West as intellectual properties owned by foreign corporations, is the case of the African Soapberry. The African Soapberry has been used traditionally for centuries as insecticide and fish intoxicant. In 1964 an Ethiopian researcher, Dr. Akilu Lemma, reported to the English Tropical Products Institute that the African Soapberry of Endod was toxic to watersnails that carried the disease dilharzia. Subsequently, the Tropical Plant Institute patented an extraction process to produce a commercial molluscicide to kill zebra mussels that clog North American waterways. Dr. Lemma was neither credited for the discovery nor receives any royalties.' 27 Even human beings are not exempt from this process. National sovereignty cuts both ways. While India or the countries of the European Union may not want to go down the path of biopatents, the United States has forged ahead full speed. Since the landmark 1980 U.S. Supreme Court case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, " ' 28 that upheld Dr. Ananda K. Chakrabarty's (a General Electric microbiologist) patent claim in a genetically engineered oil-eating bacteria, the holding thereby overturned the traditional legal rule that "products of nature" such as life-forms were not patentable subject matter. In 1985, the U.S. Patent and Trade Office (PTO) granted a patent to Dr. Kenneth Hibberd on the culture, seed, and plant of an entire line of corn. 29 In 1987, the PTO granted a patent to Philip Leder and Timothy Stewart on a genetically engineered mouse. 3 If carried to its logical extreme, the question arises that if a genetically engineered mouse could be patented, why not a genetically engineered person (or part of a person)?
For years epidemiologists have noted that a virus associated with hairy-cell leukemia was prevalent among the Guayami tribe in Panama. In the early 1990s, U.S. researchers took blood samples from members of the Guayami tribe to analyze. In particular, the blood of a twenty-six year old mother of two who had contracted hairy-cell leukemia interested the researchers. In December 1991, acting on the behest of the U.S. Commerce Department, the researchers applied for a patent on a cultivated cell line from the Guayami woman's blood. The patent application listed Dr. Jonathan Kaplan of the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta as the "inventor" of the cell line.'
Opposition to the global politics of intellectual property is emerging. For example, in March 1995, the European Parliament voted to ban the patenting of life-forms. When news of the patent application for the Guayami woman's cell line reached the press, religious leaders and indigenous communities were outraged, and the Commerce Department eventually abandoned its patent application in November 1993. In October 1993, on Gandhi's birthday, 500,000 Indian farmers staged a mass protest in Bangladore at the Indian offices of Cargill Seeds Private Ltd., a subsidiary of the largest privately held corporation in the United States. The farmers objected to the patenting of the neem seed which had been used in their farming communities for centuries-as well as the agricultural and intellectual property provisions of the then imminent GATT.' 3 2 failure. The cause ofthe failure was unclear. Monsanto also sells a genetically engineered variety of cotton called BOLLGARD that was bioengineered with Bacillus thurengesis DNA to produce proteins that were toxic to the bollworm; however, BOLLGARD cotton ended up having twenty to fifty times the normal level of bollworm infestation. However, to the extent that the use of patented seed stock such as ROUNDUP READY or BOLLGARD become widespread, farmers who use such stock must sign restrictive licensing agreements wherein they agree to terms such as allowing Monsanto to inspect their fields, to use only Monsanto-brand herbicides and not to save seed for further planting-all of which contribute to both further centralization ofagribusiness and increasing as well as potentially disastrous dependence on vulnerable monocultured seed stock (ten seed companies control about forty percent of the commercial seed market' 38 )-results that some have referred to as "bioserfdom" underwritten by our intellectual property laws.'
39
CONCLUSION
This Article has briefly raised questions about the emerging globalized vision of intellectual property protection embedded in multilateral agreements such as the TRIPS component of GATT. In particular, there are serious distributive questions about the international political economy of intellectual property protection as between the "have" and "have-not" nations that should be addressed sooner rather than later. Additionally, on both national and international levels, the question of constructing and maintaining an intellectual public domain or commons remains extremely important, if only because the unprecedented grab by intellectual property owners of the developed nations of the North seems to be imminent. This grabbing obscures traditional understanding (at least within the Anglo-American intellectual property tradition) that intellectual property law is about striking a vital and important balance between the rights of authors and inventors and the public of consumers and users as well as the fact that all intellectual property owners are also users.
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, what are we to make ofthe massive and generally uncompensated flow of cultural and biological resources out of 
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GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL [Vol. 6:11 the developing and least developed nations of the South (where they are characterized as "raw materials" or "naturally occurring") into the laboratories, universities, and factories of the developed nations of the North and emerge as strongly-protected and economically valuable intellectual properties, protected against "pirates" of the developing nations by multilateral intellectual property agreements? At the very least, it is becoming increasingly clear that, whether on the domestic or international level, the vicious circle of increasingly strong (and virtually automatic) intellectual property protection comes with some serious costs on both the local and global levels and deserves to be addressed now.
